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THE AFFECT HEURISTIC IN EARLY JUDGMENTS OF PRODUCT 
INNOVATIONS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
According to the affect heuristic, people often rely upon their overall affective 
impression of a target to form judgments of risk.  However, innovation research has 
largely characterized risk perception as a function of what the consumer knows rather 
than how they feel. In three studies, this research investigates the use of the affect 
heuristic in consumer judgments of product innovations. The findings indicate that 
judgments of risks and benefits associated with product innovations are inversely related 
and affectively congruent with evaluations of those innovations. Additionally, more 
affectively extreme evaluations are associated with increasingly disparate judgments of 
risk and benefit. This research contributes to our theoretical understanding of both 
consumers’ evaluations of innovations and the affect heuristic.  Implications and 
suggestions for future research are also discussed. 
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THE AFFECT HEURISTIC IN EARLY JUDGMENTS OF PRODUCT 
INNOVATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 Tomorrow a cell phone manufacturer will release their newest creation.  A flashy 
model with great new features not found on any other phone in the marketplace today. 
Undoubtedly, the phone will be promoted using a series of strategic press releases, social 
media campaigns and colorful advertisements. What processes will consumers use to 
weigh the potential risks and benefits associated with adopting this innovation?  
Existing innovation adoption literature suggests that consumers will proceed 
through a series of adoption stages described by Rogers (2003). From this perspective, 
prospective consumers carefully gather and consider information to form a well reasoned, 
analytical evaluation of the risks and benefits associated with the innovation. While much 
previous research supports this account, the present research suggests a complementary, 
affective process to explain how consumers form early judgments of new products.   
Marketing practitioners have long maintained an interest in explaining how 
consumers make decisions regarding innovative products (Hauser et al., 2006).  
Concurrently, researchers have been working more broadly to understand the role of 
affect in consumer behavior (Cohen et al., 2008). This work has proved fruitful and 
substantially advanced our theoretical understanding of how people use affective 
information (feelings) to inform decision making. Affect here is defined as… Affect is 
different than moods or specific emotions…. Kahneman (2003) for example, argues that 
decisions arise from two interrelated, but distinct systems. To arrive at an evaluative 
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judgment or decision, an individual may use both an intuitive, experiential decision 
process (system 1), relying upon heuristics to efficiently process information in 
conjunction with a more effortful, reasoned, cognitive process (system 2) to carefully 
analyze information at hand. Researchers have found that affect is a central component of 
both processes, and is used as an input for many judgments (Schwarz and Clore, 1988) 
because it often provides useful information (Feldman Barrett and Salovey, 2002, Pham 
and Avnet, 2009).   
Although emotion and affective decision processes are acknowledged as 
important by consumer behavior researchers, the literature investigating innovation 
adoption decisions has remained focused largely on analytical processes (Wood and 
Moreau, 2006). The present research addresses this gap by examining how consumers use 
affective information to determine the risks associated with innovation adoption 
decisions. Specifically, we present evidence that risk and benefit evaluations regarding 
innovations are often related because judgments of both attributes are influenced by a 
consumer’s affective response to an innovation. In the following sections, we review 
previous innovation adoption literature as well as theory surrounding the use of affect in 
decision making. Then, we present three experimental studies demonstrating consumers’ 
use of an “affect heuristic” in forming evaluations of innovations. Finally, we conclude 
by discussing the theoretical implications of these findings and offering suggestions for 
additional research. 
Innovation Adoption Processes  
Innovation adoption research has largely centered on predicting the rate of 
adoption in aggregate rather than individual adoption decisions in isolation (Herzenstein 
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et al., 2007). Researchers have approached the question of how consumers adopt 
innovations from multiple perspectives considering individual characteristics, situational 
factors and product attributes that promote or inhibit adoption (Hauser, et al., 2006, 
Rogers, 2003). Various individual differences influence how consumers choose to adopt 
innovations (Gatignon and Robertson, 1991, Jansson et al., 2011, Manning et al., 1995, 
Wood and Swait, 2002). For example, a sizeable quantity of research has focused on 
defining and measuring the concept of consumer innovativeness—a consumer’s 
propensity to adopt new products (Hauser, et al., 2006, Hirschman, 1980). Dispositional 
innovativeness influences the way in which consumers respond to product attributes and 
marketing communications (Steenkamp and Gielens, 2003). Other individual difference 
attributes that have been considered include prior expertise (Moreau et al., 2001) and 
both dispositional and situational regulatory focus (Herzenstein, et al., 2007).   
Other researchers have explored how the decision context influences evaluations 
of innovations. Alexander et al. (2008) demonstrated that when considering adopting an 
innovation in the distant future, consumers initially focus on the benefits that the 
prospective product could provide. As the time to adoption nears, this focus shifts and 
consumers become more concerned with the practicalities of purchasing and using a 
product.  Evidence of a similar shift in perspective was found by Castaño et al. (2008) 
who suggested that promotional messaging should transition from a focus on potential 
outcomes for temporally distant adoption decisions to encouraging consumers to 
visualize the processes of how they might adopt the product when the decision was close 
at hand. They also found that the emotions experienced by consumers shift from 
optimism about a temporally distant adoption to anxiety regarding an adoption decision 
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in the near-future. In the current research, we investigate how positive or negative 
valenced feelings such as these can influence subsequent evaluations of an innovation.  
The role of emotions in evaluations of innovations was considered in another set 
of studies conducted by Wood and Moreau (2006).  They found that negative and 
positive emotions could arise as consumers first learn to use an innovation.  Their 
findings indicated that product demonstrations help to improve the accuracy of novices 
(but not experienced consumers) in their predictions about how difficult it will be to learn 
to use a new product. Their research also found evidence that the disconfirmation of 
complexity expectations as consumers first use innovations can trigger emotions that 
subsequently influence post trial product evaluations. The present research differs from 
that of Wood and Moreau (2006) by considering the importance of affect much earlier in 
the adoption process, as it is elicited in response to the initial presentation of an 
innovation.  
In regards to product attributes, the relative advantage, complexity, trialability and 
observability of an innovation have all be found to influence the rate of adoption (Rogers, 
2003). Additional factors such as affordability, visual comprehensibility, and adaptability 
have also received some attention (Nakata and Weidner, 2012). The perceived riskiness 
of an innovation was identified early on as one of the most salient factors thought to 
influence innovation adoption decisions (Ostlund, 1974, Rogers, 2003, Sheth, 1981). 
Because innovations are inherently novel, the benefits they may provide are uncertain (or 
unproven), as are the risks associated with their adoption (Veryzer Jr, 1998). These risks 
may originate from a myriad of sources including switching costs, social and personal 
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disappointment, hidden ownership costs, unknown quality attributes, the potential for 
physical harm, and uncertainty in service delivery (Ram and Sheth, 1989, Sheth, 1981).  
In whatever form, risk perception regarding innovations has been conceptualized 
largely as an analytical assessment. For example, Ram and Sheth (1989) discuss risk as a 
barrier to innovation adoption by noting that “consumers, aware of the risks, try to 
postpone innovation adoption until they can learn more about it” (p. 8).  In their recent 
meta-analysis, Arts et al. (2011) described how models such as Rogers’ innovation 
diffusion theory (2003), the technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989), the theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, Sheppard et al., 1988) and the theory of 
planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) have all been used to explain consumer innovation 
adoption decisions. In each of these theories, innovation adoption is conceptualized as an 
uncertainty reduction process (Mahajan et al., 1990, Rogers, 2003). As customers gain an 
increased understanding of an innovation, they are better able to assess its benefits 
(Hoeffler, 2003). A key element in this line of thought is that consumers form attitudes 
through the reduction of uncertainty. While these attitudes are conceptualized as partially 
affective in nature, their formation occurs through a bottom-up cognitive process in 
which consumers carefully gather and consider available information, then make a 
decision. The present research considers an alternative explanation for how consumers 
form early judgments of product innovations. 
Affective Decision Making 
Feelings provide consumers with an important source of information. In a now 
classic study, Schwarz and Clore (1983) demonstrated that people selectively rely upon 
their feelings as a source of information when those feelings are perceived to be relevant 
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to the judgment at hand. Numerous additional studies (Gorn et al., 1993, Keltner et al., 
1993) have substantiated the important informational role of affect in decision making. 
Pham et al. (2001) applied this feelings-as-information framework to demonstrate 
differences in reason-based versus affect-based judgments toward advertising. Their 
findings indicated that affective judgments are often faster, more consistent across 
individuals, and more predictive of thoughts toward a target than reason-based 
judgments. 
This perspective is also compatible with the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara 
et al., 2000, Damasio, 2000, Hinson et al., 2002) which originated from clinical work 
suggesting that people, in part, make decisions by relying upon emotions arising from the 
recall of emotionally marked images. The positive and negative markers associated with 
these images influence the extent to which people prefer one option to another. The 
influence of these emotions is largely unconscious and occurs automatically as 
individuals anticipate the consequence of possible decisions. 
 Affect may arise directly as a person encounters a novel object that elicits an 
affective reaction or as a consequence of cognitive processing (Duckworth et al., 2002, 
Schwarz and Clore, 2007). Work by Slovic et al. (2002) has provided evidence that 
individuals use affect as a heuristic in forming more complex judgments. The “affect 
heuristic” is based on the idea that when forming a judgment, it is more efficient for 
people to rely upon their overall affective impression of the object than it is for them to 
cognitively weigh all available information. Evidence for the affect heuristic has been 
provided by studies demonstrating that both benefit and risk evaluations of some target 
can be explained, in particular contexts, by a participant’s more general affective 
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experience in response to a target (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994, Finucane et al., 2000). 
Other research has also shown support for affect as a basis for risk assessment. For 
example, in their study of the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, Lowenstein et al. (2001) argued 
that affective reactions can sometimes diverge from cognitive evaluations of risk. In these 
cases, affect often provides the dominant influence to a variety of judgments. 
Because risk perception has been found to be a critical driver of innovation 
adoption decisions (Ostlund, 1974, Rogers, 2003, Sheth, 1981), it is important to consider 
how perceptions of risk might be influenced by affect. As discussed above, risk 
perception regarding innovations has largely been described as a function of what the 
consumer has learned about the new product (Ram and Sheth, 1989). Certainly this 
knowledge is important. However, the affect heuristic suggests that how a consumer feels 
about a product may also determine evaluations of risk (and other attributes).  
While both the risks and benefits associated with adopting an innovation are often 
uncertain, the benefits gained from adopting an innovation are qualitatively different than 
the risks posed by the adoption. For example, the expected benefits from adopting an 
electric vehicle (e.g., emissions free transportation) are largely separate from the 
associated risks (e.g., concerns about long term reliability).  In most instances, if risks 
and benefits are associated to any extent, the benefits of adopting an innovation are likely 
to be positively related to the risks of adopting the innovation. As Finucane, et al. (2000, 
p. 3) suggest:  
“Whereas activities that bring great benefits may be high or low in risk, activities 
that are low in benefit are unlikely to be high in risk (if they were, they would be 
proscribed), suggesting the positive correlation...” 
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In a product context, this idea translates into the reality that products that are risky and 
offer little benefit are unlikely to be successful in the marketplace. However, the work of 
Alhakami and Slovic (1994) as well as Finucane, et al. (2000) demonstrate that in many 
situations, people perceive risks and benefits to be inversely (i.e. negatively) related. That 
is, the greater the perceived risk, the lower the perceived benefit and visa versa. A 
plausible explanation of this inverse relationship is that the assessment of both risk and 
benefit are both derived from the same underlying affective response (positive/negative). 
Consumers draw upon this affective experience and use it to form congruent judgments 
of other attributes. Positive affect, therefore, promotes a favorable assessment of benefits, 
and a deflated assessment of risks, whereas disliking produces the opposite pattern.  
Thus, the inverse relationship between risk and benefit comes to exists in people’s minds 
when they use affect to inform their judgments (Slovic, et al., 2002).  
Prior research into the affect heuristic has primarily focused on judgments of the 
risks and benefits associated with broadly defined hazardous technologies (e.g., food 
preservatives, nuclear power and pesticides) and activities (e.g., firefighting, air travel 
and surgery) in reference to how they would impact society as a whole (Alhakami and 
Slovic, 1994, Finucane, et al., 2000). Participants in these studies had prior knowledge 
and attitudes about these technologies or activities.  What has not been investigated is 
how the affect heuristic might be used to form evaluations of unfamiliar activities or 
product innovations. The current research helps to address this gap by investigating how 
the affect heuristic applies to judgments of new products. Existing research offers mixed 
evidence regarding how consumers use affect in judgments of novel stimuli. When 
evaluating novel financial assets Ganzach (2000) found that, even among people who are 
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well trained at analyzing stock markets, estimates of the risks and returns associated with 
unfamiliar stock indexes tend to be negatively related and congruent with their global 
preferences for the assets. This finding is compelling because the risks and benefits of 
financial markets objectively should be positively correlated (increasing risk should bring 
increasing returns). Similarly, Macgregor et al. (2000) investigated the role of imagery 
and affect in decisions about initial public offerings (IPOs). Their results indicated that 
affective evaluations of various industries were positively related to expected future 
returns, as well as participants’ estimates of how likely they would be to invest in those 
industries. The authors concluded that while an investor’s affective evaluation may not 
accurately predict future fluctuations in financial markets, it is nonetheless influential in 
decisions related to unfamiliar financial assets. Other evidence suggests consumers may 
be less likely to use affect in uncertain contexts such as the evaluation of new products. 
For example, in their studies, Greifeneder et al. (2011) found that participants were more 
likely to rely on their feelings when making fairness judgments under conditions of 
greater personal certainty.  However, participants relied on more analytical processes 
when faced with greater personal uncertainty.  Thus, both analytical and affective process 
have been suggested to dominate when consumers are faced with uncertainty.  
In three experiments we address the extent to which feelings dominate early 
evaluations of new products. We begin by demonstrating that judgments of risk and 
benefit are connected in the minds of consumers.  In the first two studies we adapt 
paradigms that have been used to study judgments of known social hazards (Finucane, et 
al., 2000). The results of these studies demonstrate that a greater reliance on affective 
processes correspond to a stronger relationship between risk and benefit judgments.  
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Further, information about one attribute (e.g. benefits) can influence judgments of the 
other, unrelated attribute (e.g. risks).  Finally, in our third study we demonstrate that by 
manipulating the favorability of a new product, risk and benefit judgments change in a 
systematic manner consistent with the affect heuristic. Together these findings suggest 
that feelings provide important information for early evaluations of new products.  
Study 1 
In our first study participants were assigned to one of three decision conditions 
intended to either (1) encourage reliance on affect, (2) serve as a control condition or (3) 
encourage cognitive deliberation. Previous research has suggested that when individuals 
are forced to make decisions with fewer cognitive resources available, they tend to favor 
heuristic decision making strategies (Payne et al., 1988) because they are more efficient. 
Therefore, this study included a working memory load condition that was intended to 
constrain cognitive resources and was expected to bias participants towards relying on 
affect as a heuristic when forming their judgments. In a second, control condition, 
participants were not given any additional instructions, and made formed judgments 
using whatever processes they would normally select. Finally, in a third condition 
participants were instructed to evaluate each innovation by listing and assigning weights 
to the risks and benefits associated with each product in an effort to encourage 
cognitively formed judgments.  
We expect that consumers use affect when evaluating the risks and benefits of 
product innovations. Therefore, we expect participants to indicate that those innovations 
that they like carry few risks and many benefits relative to innovations they dislike. This 
reliance on affect is expected to be attenuated in the cognitive decision making condition.  
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When participants are encouraged to cognitively elaborate on the risks and benefits the 
difference between the two judgments is expected to be smaller, and the relationship 
between the two weaker, than the risk and benefit judgments of those participants in the 
working memory load condition. This weaker association and smaller difference would 
indicate that judgments of risk and benefit were formed from different sources of 
information. This study did not consider the “real-world” relationship between risk and 
benefit for the product innovations. The information provided to participants in all 
conditions was the same.  Thus, any variance in risk and benefit perception between 
conditions was due to differences in processing styles. 
Methodology 
Participants (N = 150) were randomly assigned to one of three decision 
conditions: Working Memory (WM) Load, Control or Cognitive.  Each participant 
evaluated a random selection of six (out of 16 possible) products. 
Procedure 
Sixteen product innovations were selected for this study and are shown in 
appendix A. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions. One group of 
participants was placed under a working memory load immediately before evaluating 
each product innovation. This was accomplished by asking participants to remember a 
nine-digit number (e.g., “Please remember the following number. Do not write anything 
down, try to remember the number in your head: 762714112”) while they evaluated each 
product (for an example see: Shiv and Huber, 2000). Participants in the control condition 
were simply asked to evaluate each product without further instructions. Finally, 
participants in the cognitive condition were asked to generate a list of the risks and 
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benefits associated with each innovation and then rank each before making summary 
judgments of the product’s risks and benefits (order counterbalanced). 
After being presented with a picture and brief description of each product, 
participants (depending on their condition) were asked to “choose a point on the scale 
that best matches your opinion of the innovation you just saw.” To capture affective 
responses to the product innovations, participants evaluated the favorability of each 
innovation on a three item 11-point scale (I dislike it/ I like it, Bad/Good, 
Unfavorable/Favorable). Judgments of risk for each product were collected on an 11-
point scale anchored by “Very Risky” and “Not at All Risky.” Judgments of benefits 
were also measured on an 11-point scale anchored by “Very Beneficial” and “Not at All 
Beneficial.” After providing their judgments of each product, participants in the working 
memory load condition were asked to recall the nine-digit number. 
 Results 
Means and standard deviations for all dependent variables are listed in table 1. 
Correlations between risk and benefit, across subjects for each innovation and within 
each condition are shown in table 2.  In the cognitive condition, the relationship between 
risk and benefit judgments was expected to be weaker, and the absolute difference 
between the two judgments expected to be smaller, than those participants who provided 
judgments under a working memory load.  The results supported this hypothesis.  The 
average correlation between risk and benefit ratings across innovations for the cognitive 
condition was -.22.  In the control condition, the average correlation between risk and 
benefits was -.42, which was stronger than the cognitive condition (z = 3.24, p < .01). 
Finally, in the working memory load condition, the correlation between risk and benefit 
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judgments across innovations was -.43, which was greater than the measured risk/benefit 
correlation in the cognitive condition, but not significantly different than the correlation 
between the two variables in control condition (z = -.21, p < .41).  
A mixed model analysis indicated that participants favorability evaluations 
differed between conditions (F(2,1487) = 3.37, p = .04). Overall, participants provided 
less favorable evaluations of innovations after listing risks and benefits in the cognitive 
condition (MCognitive = 7.60) than they did in the control condition (MControl = 7.93) or the 
working memory load condition (MWM Load = 7.98; t(1487) = 2.13, p = .03; t(1487) = 2.48, 
p = .01).  There was no difference in favorability evaluations between the control and 
working memory conditions (t(1487) = .71, p > .05). The absolute difference between 
risk and benefit also differed between conditions (F(2,1488) = 3.52, p = .03). Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that absolute risk/benefit differences in the control condition 
(MControl = 4.06) and working memory load condition (MWM Load = 4.16) were both greater 
than those in the cognitive condition (MCognitive = 3.65; t(1488) = 2.07, p = .04; t(1488) = 
2.59, p = .01), but were not different from each other (t(1488) = .57, p > .05). 
The pattern of correlations between risks and benefits at an individual product 
level was similar.  Significant negative risk/benefit relationships were observed among 
ten products (63%) in the control condition and among nine products (56%) in the 
working memory load condition. However, significant negative relationships were 
observed among only three of the product innovations (19%) in the cognitive condition.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
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Discussion 
In the first study, we found support for the idea that affect may underlie early 
judgments of risk and benefit for novel product innovations. We expected strength of the 
relationship between risk and benefit judgments to differ depending on the process by 
which the judgments were formed.  Those participants who were placed under a working 
memory load were expected to more heavily favor heuristic processing styles and use 
affect as a common basis for forming judgments of risk and benefit producing a stronger 
negative correlation and greater absolute risk/benefit differences.  Conversely, 
participants assigned to the cognitive condition were expected to form judgments of risk 
independently from judgments of benefit, producing a weaker negative correlation and 
smaller absolute risk/benefit differences.  This pattern of results was also observed.   
The correlations among risk and benefit in the control condition were similar in 
strength to those in the working memory condition. This pattern of results is interesting 
because it suggests that the default process used by study participants to form judgments 
of product attributes was more similar to that used when cognitive resources are 
constrained (WM load condition) than to a more cognitive process of forming judgments.  
Such an explanation is compatible with other research suggesting that automatic, 
intuitive, heuristic decision making styles often function as the default when establishing 
evaluative judgments (Kahneman, 2011, Pham et al., 2001).  
Study 2 
Our second study further examines the role of the affect heuristic in forming 
judgments of risk and benefit. Participants in this study were asked to evaluate a series of 
innovations twice. After the first evaluation, participants were given information about 
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either the risks or benefits associated with each innovation. Then, participants were asked 
to re-evaluate the products. The study was designed to test if the provision of information 
alters consumer judgments of the non-manipulated attribute in an affectively congruent 
manner. Such affectively congruent changes would indicate that judgments of risk or 
benefit are not considered independently, but rather based on overall affective evaluations 
of the innovation. 
If affect functions as a common source of information when forming judgments, 
than information that serves to change judgments of risk or benefit should result in an 
affectively congruent shift in the non-manipulated attribute. For example, an affect 
heuristic would predict that providing information that reduces the risk of adopting an 
innovation should produce a positive affective response (i.e. increased favorability). 
When used as a source of information, this positive affect should subsequently increase 
judgments of the innovation’s benefits. Alternatively, if the information provided serves 
to heighten the perceived riskiness of adopting an innovation, a consumer should 
experience negative affect (i.e. decreased favorability). When consulted, this negative 
affect should lead to a diminished evaluation of the product’s benefits. A similar inverse 
pattern could be expected from judgments of risk if the consumer was provided 
information about the benefits of a product. Thus, we expect manipulations to one 
attribute to produce changes to another, unrelated attribute, because both are based upon 
a common affective source. 
Methodology 
Participants (N = 150) were randomly assigned to one of four information 
conditions (high-risk, low-risk, high-benefit, low-benefit) and evaluated three different 
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innovations (Power Mat, Vaccine Strips, Simple GPS) in a pretest-posttest design. 
Several unrelated studies served as filler tasks separating the pre- and posttest measures. 
Procedure 
During the initial presentation, each participant was presented with a picture and a 
brief description of each innovation (see descriptions in appendix A) in a randomized 
order. After viewing each innovation, participants completed the set of measures that 
were used in study 1. Participants then completed approximately 30 minutes of filler 
tasks. After completing the filler tasks, participants received the following instructions: 
“The subsequent page contains some general information about the risks (benefits) 
associated with each of several innovations. Even though it is recognized that there are 
also some benefits (risks) associated with these products, these will not be dealt with at 
this time.” Following the instructions, subjects were presented with a picture and 
description of each innovation for a second time (in a randomized order) along with 
additional information intended to influence their evaluations of either risks or benefits, 
depending upon the condition to which they were assigned (see appendix B for each 
condition). This information was written so that it did not contain any information about 
the non-manipulated attribute. After being presented with information about the risks or 
benefits of each innovation, participants evaluated each a second time using the same 
measures.  
Results 
Separate mean values were calculated for risk and benefit ratings across 
participants for each innovation. From these values, a mean difference measure was 
calculated which was then divided by the standard error of the mean difference measure 
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to produce a t-value for both the manipulated and non-manipulated attributes. Figure 1 
provides a plot of these values.  
The plotted t-values (see figure 1) demonstrate a clear negative relationship 
between changes in the manipulated and non-manipulated attributes. The overall 
correlation of the 12 points plotted in figure 1 was -.87. As expected the results suggest 
that perceptions of risk and benefit were not judged independently. Of the 12 sets (three 
innovations x four conditions) of t-values, 10 evidenced changes in both the manipulated 
and non-manipulated variables in the directions expected. That is, manipulations to either 
risk or benefit produced affectively congruent changes to the other, non-manipulated 
attribute. Within the two sets of t-values that did not change in the direction expected 
(Power Matt/high-benefit and Vaccine Strips/low-benefit), the manipulated attribute 
(benefit for both) did not change significantly (t(36) = .98, p = .34 and t(39) = -.55, p = 
.58 respectively) between the two measurement occasions. That is, manipulations 
intended to alter perceptions of benefits did not produce changes as expected. However, 
the non-manipulated attribute (risk) in both of these conditions did change significantly 
(t(36) = -2.24, p = .03 and t(39) = 4.60, p < .01 respectively), in a direction that was 
opposite that which was anticipated, but which was affectively congruent with the 
directional changes observed in the manipulated attribute. This again is evidence that 
participants consulted their feelings as a common source of information when 
determining their judgments rather than forming judgments of risk and benefit 
independently.  
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
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A second method of analyzing the data from study 2 examined individual 
participant reactions to the manipulations. Tables 3 and 4 summarize these reactions. The 
bottom row of table 3 shows that the manipulation functioned as expected in 59.1% of 
trials (e.g., a subject who received information intended to increase perceptions of risk 
indicated higher perceived risk at time 2 than at time 1), produced no change in 14.2% of 
the trials, and produced an effect that was opposite what was expected in 26.7% of trials 
(e.g. a subject who received information intended to increase perceptions of risk indicated 
lower perceived risk at time 2 than at time 1). The high-risk manipulations were among 
the most successful with the manipulation acting to increase risk in 75.2% of trials. In 
contrast, the high-benefit conditions were the least successful, producing an increase in 
benefit judgments in 42.7% of trials. The success rates of the manipulations were similar 
across each of the three innovations. 
The effects of risk and benefit information on the non-manipulated attributes are 
shown in table 4. In 59.1% of instances in which the manipulation worked as expected 
(from table 3), the non-manipulated attribute changed in an affectively congruent 
direction 62.4% of the time. Thus, in the majority of cases in which the manipulation 
worked as intended (e.g., information intended to increase perceptions of risk actually led 
to increases in risk perceptions), the non-manipulated attribute (e.g., benefit) changed in a 
direction opposite that of the manipulated attribute (e.g., perceptions of benefits 
decreased). An additional 20.7% of these cases produced no change in the non-
manipulated attribute. In only 16.9% of cases did participants indicate that the non-
manipulated attribute changed in the same direction as the manipulated attribute 
(opposite of what was predicted).  
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When the presentation of information failed to produce an effect on the 
manipulated attribute (no change, row 2 of table 4), the non-manipulated attribute should 
remain constant or be equally as likely to change in either direction. This pattern was 
observed. The percentage of cases in which the non-manipulated attribute did not change 
(31.3%), changed as expected (39.1%), or moved in a direction that was opposite 
expectations (29.7%) was relatively similar. 
Finally, in those instances in which the manipulated attribute changed in a 
direction that was contrary to the manipulation (e.g., judgments of risk decreased in 
response to information intended to increase perceptions of risk), the non-manipulated 
attribute was found to have changed in the predicted direction only 30.8% of the time 
(judgments of benefits decreased in the example above). Comparing this value to that of 
the cell in the first column and first row of table 4 (62.4%), it is apparent that the values 
are starkly different. Overall, the non-manipulated attribute was more likely to move in a 
manner inverse to changes in the manipulated attribute even in those instances in which 
the manipulation did not function as expected. In 51.7% of trials, the non-manipulated 
attribute moved inversely (but affectively congruently) to the manipulated attribute, even 
though the manipulation produced an effect contrary to the intentions of the study (see 
row 3, column 2 in table 4).   
[Insert table 3 about here] 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
Discussion 
Overall, the results of study 2 provide additional support for the use of the affect 
heuristic in consumer evaluations of innovations. Information that changed judgments of 
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one attribute (e.g. greater beneficial) also produced inverse changes to another attribute 
(e.g. reduced risk). Changes in the non-manipulated attribute commonly occurred in a 
direction affectively congruent with changes in the manipulated attribute. This pattern 
was found even among instances in which the manipulation did not function as expected. 
The results diverge from what would be expected if consumer judgments of these 
attributes were derived only from a cognitive consideration of the information provided 
and suggests that participants consulted their overall affective experience regarding each 
product innovation to infer judgments of risk or benefit. 
The t-values plotted in figure 1 demonstrated the strong inverse relationship 
between risk and benefit across conditions and innovations. At the individual level, the 
inverse risk/benefit relationship was more apparent. Successful manipulations of either 
risks or benefits produced inverse changes in the non-manipulated attribute. When 
manipulations produced changes that were opposite of what was intended, this inverse 
relationship still held. In their study of non-novel social hazards, Finucane, et al. (2000) 
used a similar paradigm and found support for the relationships observed in the present 
study. For example, in the present study the manipulations worked in more instances 
(59% versus 50%). Further, the non-manipulated attribute changed in an affectively 
congruent direction in a greater number of instances in the present study (62% versus 
45% among instances in which the manipulation worked as expected and 52% versus 
33% among those instances in which the manipulation produced an opposite change than 
expected).  
The findings from study 2 are important because they demonstrate a causal, 
inverse relationship between judgments of an innovation’s risks and benefits that is 
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congruent with the use of the affect heuristic. Study 3 seeks to further demonstrate this 
relationship by manipulating favorability rather than risk or benefit.  
Study 3 
In study 3, we sought to manipulate affective responses to an innovation without 
providing risk or benefit information. Before participants began this study, they were 
informed that the majority of participants from an earlier data collection had indicated 
that they liked (disliked) each of the innovations they were about to see. This 
manipulation was selected because it did not convey any information about the risks and 
benefits associated with the products. Past research indicates that providing information 
about how others evaluate a target can influence consumer preferences (Burnkrant and 
Cousineau, 1975, Morwitz and Pluzinski, 1996). Thus, participants who were instructed 
that previous participants liked the innovations were expected to like the products more 
than participants who were instructed that previous participants disliked the innovations. 
This information was expected to influence study participant’s affective evaluation of the 
products and correspondingly produce affectively congruent changes in judgments of 
both risk and benefit.  A control condition was also included in which participants were 
not provided any information about other student’s preferences. 
This study tests a theoretical extension of the affect heuristic.  We predict that, at 
an individual level, positive feelings in response to an innovation should correspond with 
higher ratings of benefit and lower ratings of risk compared to more neutral feelings. 
Assuming this relationship holds, it would follow that an increasingly intense affective 
response toward an innovation (good/bad) should strengthen the negative relationship 
between risk and benefit judgments. Accordingly, this relationship would be attenuated in 
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the presence of neutral affective responses (e.g., neither like nor dislike). In other words, 
increasingly strong evaluations (e.g., I love it!) should correspond with more polarized 
judgments of risk and benefit (e.g., benefit is very high, risk is very low).   
Methodology 
Participants (N = 42) were assigned one of the three instruction conditions 
(favorable, control or unfavorable) and evaluated the three product innovations (tricycle, 
dog bowl and fruit bowl) presented in random order.  
Procedure 
Depending on their condition, participants were instructed: “In this study we are 
interested in your opinions of new products and concepts. On the following screens you 
will be presented with 3 different new products that were favorably (unfavorably) 
evaluated in a previous study similar to this one. In that study, the majority of participants 
indicated that they liked (disliked) each of these products. Please answer the questions to 
the best of your ability.” Participants in the control condition were not given any 
information about other participants who may have evaluated the products and were 
simply told that they would be presented with three products and asked to give their 
opinion of each. After reading the instructions, participants were presented the 
innovations and asked to evaluate each using the measures from the first study.  
Results 
The results of study 3 are shown in table 5. An ANOVA analysis indicated 
differences in overall evaluations by condition (F(2,39) = 4.31, p = .02). Planned 
contrasts revealed that the overall evaluations of participants assigned to the favorable 
instruction group (Mfavorable = 8.30) and the control group (Mcontrol = 8.06) were more 
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favorable than those assigned to the unfavorable instruction group (Munfavorable = 6.74; 
t(39) = 2.90, p = .01). The mean evaluation for participants who were told that previous 
study participants disliked the innovations was near the midpoint of the scale (six on an 
11-point scale). No statistical difference in overall evaluations was observed between 
those assigned to the favorable condition and those in the control condition (t(39) =.46, p 
> .05). Thus, the average evaluation of those who were provided negative information is 
best characterized as neutral rather than negative, whereas those participants assigned to 
the other two conditions held favorable evaluations.1  
 The affect heuristic predicts that more extreme affective responses should 
correspond to a stronger negative relationship between risks and benefits. To test this 
hypothesis, a measure of the difference between risk and benefit for each innovation was 
calculated and then averaged across products. Greater differences between risk and 
benefit were expected to correspond with more affectively extreme evaluations.  An 
ANOVA revealed significant differences in this risk-benefit difference score among 
instruction conditions (F(2,39) = 12.95, p < .01). Planned contrasts revealed that the risk-
benefit difference scores for those participants who were told that previous study 
participants liked the innovations (Mfavorable = -4.38) and those assigned to the control 
condition (Mcontrol = -4.04) was larger than the scores of those participants who were 
instructed that previous study participants did not like the innovations (Munfavorable = .67, 
t(39) = 5.08, p < .01). However, the difference scores of the control group did not differ 
from those of the favorable instruction group (t(39) = .33, p > .05). Similarly, risk 
judgments were lower and benefit judgments higher in the favorable and control 
                                                
1 This analysis was also conducted using a repeated measures ANOVA. The results of that analysis 
indicated within subjects differences in evaluations of the innovations (the tricycle was preferred over the 
other two innovations), but no interaction between the different innovations and instructional conditions. 
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conditions relative to the unfavorable condition (t(39) = 5.35, p < .01; t(39)=2.77, p < 
.01). These results reflect the observed differences in participant’s overall evaluation of 
these innovations and suggest that study participants were using this evaluation to inform 
judgments of risk and benefit. Those conditions that produced more extreme overall 
evaluations (favorable information and control conditions) also produced greater 
differences in judgments of risk and benefit. Conversely, when participants were 
provided with unfavorable information, their evaluation of the innovations was less 
positive (almost neutral) and the perceived difference between risk and benefit was 
attenuated.  
[Insert table 5 about here] 
Discussion 
The results of study 3 again suggest that the affect heuristic influences risk and 
benefit judgments of product innovations. More extreme evaluations were shown to 
correspond with greater differences between risk and benefit judgments.  This 
relationship can be explained by study participants basing these judgments on their 
underlying affective response to the products, rather than available information about 
each. The instructions provided to participants acted to increase or decrease overall 
favorability but were devoid of information about the risks and benefits associated with 
the product. The manipulations achieved their purpose of producing variations in overall 
evaluations but must be interpreted with respect to the scaling of favorability evaluations. 
Participants from the control condition and those who were provided with positive 
information provided similarly favorable evaluations (e.g. “I like it”) of the innovations. 
The observation that members of the control group also provided favorable evaluations is 
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reflective of a known pro-innovation bias, whereby innovations are often perceived as 
inherently favorable (Rogers, 1976).  As predicted by the affect heuristic, sizable 
differences between judgments of risk and benefit were found among participants in these 
two groups.  In contrast, participants who were provided with negative information 
indicated less favorable (almost neutral) evaluations of the innovations. As expected, this 
indifferent summary judgment was associated with judgments of nearly equivalent 
amounts of risk and benefit associated with the products, evidenced by a low mean 
difference score. This shift in the pattern of judgments suggests that participant’s were 
basing their judgments of risk and benefit on affect experienced in response to the 
product innovations. 
General Discussion 
 This research intended to investigate the use of the affect heuristic in early 
consumer evaluations of product innovations. Extant literature characterizes consumer 
risk assessment of innovations as primarily an analytical consideration of the information 
at hand. However, the results of these studies demonstrate that a consumer’s feelings may 
also influence their judgments. Judgments of both risk and benefit were shown to be 
interrelated and the pattern of results is consistent with the affect heuristic. The negative 
risk/benefit relationship discussed by Alhakami and Slovic (1994) and Finucane, et al. 
(2000) was also found among an assortment of product innovations, individuals and 
manipulations.  
 The first study established that judgments of risk and benefit associated with 
product innovations were negatively related. Further, more cognitive decision processes 
were found to weaken this negative relationship.  The second study provided additional 
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evidence that affect serves as a common basis for judgments of risk and benefit. 
Manipulations that influenced judgments of one attribute (e.g., increases in risk 
perception) were shown to also influence non-manipulated attributes (e.g., decreases in 
benefit) in an affectively congruent manner.  Finally, the results of the third study 
supported a theoretical extension of the affect heuristic by demonstrating that stronger 
overall evaluations corresponded with greater differences in perceptions of risk and 
benefit. More favorable evaluations were found to correspond with greater differences in 
risk and benefit whereas more neutral evaluations were associated with smaller 
differences. 
 Together, these studies contribute to both our theoretical understanding of how 
consumers form early evaluations of innovations and attest to the generalizability of the 
affect heuristic. Product innovations are marked by uncertainty both about the risks and 
benefits offered by a product. The studies presented above provided evidence that in 
many cases, affect is used to infer judgments of these attributes. While we acknowledge 
that consumers may come to understand the risks involved in adopting an innovation by 
carefully gathering information before arriving at a judgment. The results of the current 
studies also suggest that a person’s feelings about an innovation are likely to influence 
their perceptions of risk.  
 This research makes an additional contribution by demonstrating that the affect 
heuristic extends to consumer evaluations of product innovations. Such an extension 
should not be dismissed as a replication of existing research. The innovations used as 
stimuli in these studies were novel products that participants had never encountered 
before and thus had no previously formed evaluations upon which to draw. Past research 
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has suggested that feelings are often instantiated upon exposure to a stimulus and are not 
dependent upon the retrieval of cognitively formed evaluations (Pham, et al., 2001). The 
results of the current studies support this assertion. Additionally, unlike earlier research 
(Finucane, et al., 2000) participants in each of the studies were asked to make risk and 
benefit evaluations of specific products, as opposed to broad social hazards and they were 
also asked to consider these evaluations from their own perspective, rather than from the 
prospective of society as a whole. These conditions more closely match the types of 
judgments people make in the marketplace.  The finding that these effects extend to such 
contexts underscores the importance of the affect heuristic in judgment and decision 
making more generally.  
For practitioners, the results of these studies highlight the importance of 
considering affective decision making styles in consumer evaluations of new products. 
The affect heuristic helps to address several important issues confronting marketers. First, 
the affect heuristic suggests an explanation for why first impressions are so important. 
Based on the findings above, failing to create a favorable affective evaluation during the 
launch of a new product will likely bias subsequent evaluations of the product’s 
attributes.  Disliking a new product leads to inferences that the product is risky and offers 
little benefit.  Similarly for market researchers testing product concepts, these findings 
provide an explanation for why consumers often find it difficult to objectively evaluate 
really new products (Hoeffler, 2003). Rather than forming judgments by carefully 
analyzing the attributes of a product, the affect heuristic suggests that consumers may 
look at their initial affective experience, and then pattern their responses in an affectively 
congruent fashion. If so, marketers testing new product concepts should be aware that a 
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concerted effort may be required in order to get research participants to cognitively 
evaluate a new product concept.  
 This research also suggests how some product attributes can compensate for 
others. The affect heuristic centers on the idea that affect serves as a common source of 
information for evaluative judgments of an object’s attributes. Thus, specific risks (or 
benefits) of a product are likely to be overlooked if the overall evaluation is favorable. 
For marketers, this distinction carries real consequences. In the second and third studies, 
judgments of an innovation’s attributes were shown to be connected to the overall 
evaluation of the product. This implies that communications emphasizing attributes that 
serve to increase the overall favorability of a product (e.g., increase perceptions of 
benefits), could be expected to produce affectively congruent changes in evaluations of 
attributes which may be completely unrelated (e.g., decrease perceptions of risk). For 
example, public health campaigns tasked with increasing the perceived risk associated 
with cigarette smoking could choose to focus on decreasing the perceived benefits 
associated with smoking (e.g. stress relief, popularity, etc.). As shown in study 2, this 
information would be expected to decrease the favorability of smoking and thus, increase 
perceptions of risk even without addressing the risks directly.  Such possibilities 
represent fruitful opportunities for future research. 
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